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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates “social embedding,” a condition where the local 
population and the insurgency share the same goals and methods in securing political 
control of their environment. Social embedding is an important phenomenon to 
understand because, once insurgents and the population share the same goals, separating 
the two becomes exponentially more difficult; in essence, the insurgents have “won” the 
population.   The paper uses social movement theory (SMT) and its three variables 
(political opportunity, resource mobilization, and ideological framing) to explain the 
dynamic between the regime, the insurgency, and the population, and how it may lead to 
social embedding with the population or social rejection. 
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I. CONCEPT OF THE SOCIALLY EMBEDDED INSURGENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past fifty years, insurgent warfare has become one of the dominant forms 
of warfare for western militaries, particularly the United States.  From Vietnam to 
Afghanistan, small local forces have engaged larger and more powerful regimes on the 
battlefield.  Between 1968 and 2006, at least 648 terrorist and insurgent groups appeared 
around the world and over 38% of these groups are still active.1  As long as insurgent 
groups can extract painful political concessions from stronger regimes, this form of 
political violence will not fade away.   
This thesis centers on the conditions under which popular support is gained or lost 
by insurgent groups.  Specifically, I look at a phenomenon that I call “social embedding,” 
which is when an insurgent group and a local population come to share the same 
objectives, methods, and resources in resisting the regime in power.  What conditions 
convince a local population to wholly embrace an insurgent group?  How does this link 
become so strong that a state must either cede political control or use extreme force to 
break the relationship?  Is there a way to prevent social embedding before it is too late?   
This thesis aims to answer these questions.  It finds that social embedding 
between an insurgent group and the local population is not inevitable.  There are discrete 
moments in time, which I call “political opportunities,” where an insurgency can exploit 
the regime’s weakness and gain legitimacy with the people.  Likewise, there are times 
when the regime can take advantage of an insurgent’s missteps and seize the initiative.  It 
is important to recognize a political opportunity because, once social embedding occurs, 
the price for victory goes up dramatically.   
Before analyzing socially embedded insurgencies, it is essential to understand the 
current body of work on the causes and preventions of insurgency.  Insurgency warfare is 
not a new phenomenon, nor is there a dearth of writing on the subject.  This chapter will 
                                                 
1  Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End:  Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 35.   
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first focus on several theorists and their ideas on an insurgency’s popular support and 
motivations.  This discussion will lead to a description of social embedding and a 
heuristic model for analysis.  Finally, a short summary will discuss the model’s practical 
applications and limitations. 
B. A REVIEW OF INSURGENCY THEORIES 
One of the most influential writings in insurgency theory is Ted Robert Gurr’s 
Why Men Rebel. In his seminal work, Gurr develops two theories that are useful for 
understanding the conditions under which insurgencies emerge.  The first theory is 
Relative Deprivation, which posits that the people have value expectations (things to 
which they are rightfully entitled) and value capabilities (things that they are capable of 
attaining or maintaining).  When the government fails to help the people in balancing 
their expectations and capabilities, the result is collective discontent.2  
Gurr builds on collective discontent to develop the theory of frustration-anger-
aggression.  Gurr posits that frustration grows as collective discontent increases.  Over 
time, this frustration may arouse anger.  When an individual or group is in an angry state, 
it is more likely to respond violently to the source of frustration and anger. 3  An 
insurgent movement can capitalize on the frustration-anger-aggression path by 
highlighting the government’s failures in the face of rising popular expectations.  If 
successful, the insurgent can focus the resulting anger and aggression into political 
violence against the state.4   
Gurr further argues that the political violence that results from collective 
discontent has three intensity levels.  Turmoil, which included riots and clashes, is 
relatively spontaneous and unorganized.  Conspiracies, such as assassinations and coups, 
are more organized and extensively planned.  Finally, internal wars, which are the most 
violent, are widespread and highly organized. 5  The intensity of political violence is 
                                                 
2  Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 24–25.   
3  Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 34.   
4  Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 182–183.  
5  Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 10–11.  
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often related to the regime’s legitimacy, popular compliance, and the fairness of its 
policies.6  Regardless of the scale, Gurr contends that all political violence strives to 
replace or destroy the existing order.   
Gurr’s societal variables for Relative Deprivation theory are important to this 
study because they help define the parameters of political violence.  Every culture 
establishes norms under which its members can act out or internalize their anger.  Under 
the right conditions, a culture may regard violence as a justified means of expressing 
aggression.7  The power of the state, and its willingness to use violence itself, will 
determine the magnitude and success of political violence.  Finally, the justification for 
violence will stem from the state’s perceived legitimacy in the eyes of its people.8   
Mohammad Hafez builds on Gurr’s theory and applies it to the political 
environment of the Middle East.  While Gurr ties political violence to the socioeconomic 
causes in a state, Hafez contends that the political system itself is the principle cause of 
violence.  He argues that, “it is neither necessary for Islamists to be content in order to 
become moderate, nor sufficient for Islamists to be deprived to become rebellious.”9  He 
divides the political process into three distinct areas.  The political environment 
determines what methods a resistance group will use against the state, the mobilization 
structures within society will help the Islamists to both gather resources and fight off 
competition, and the ideological framing allows the group to publicize its efforts, gain 
popular support, and exert political pressure on the regime.   
Hafez advances the study of insurgencies by applying social movement theory 
(SMT) as a means of explaining the conditions under which groups rebel.  SMT is “an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of contention that focuses on the underlying 
mechanisms of collective action.”10  SMT gained popularity in the 1960s because it 
                                                 
6  Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 186.   
7  Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 164–165.   
8  Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 186.   
9  Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World 
(Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 19.   
10  Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for 
Research,” Mediterranean Politics 7, no. 3 (2002), 189–190.   
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helped to explain how protest groups, such as the civil rights movement, were able to 
grow in power and exert influence on the government.11  The theory’s strength comes 
from its three primary variables:  mobilization structures, resource availability, and 
political opportunities.12  The interaction between the three variables is useful to Hafez 
because it analyzes how a movement becomes rebellious, instead of just why.13   
Hafez is one of several scholars who use social movement theory to analyze 
social and political unrest in Muslim countries.  Snow and Marshall, who were among the 
first scholars to combine Islamic activism and SMT,14 illustrate how Islam was a “latent 
mobilization structure” that could be “tapped or activated for revolt.”15  Wiktorowicz 
describes how Islamists use their social interactions to provide for the population, recruit 
followers, and propagate their ideology.16 Bayat argues that the “imagined solidarity” of 
a social movement is the best way to explain how Islamism makes constant political 
adjustments without losing popularity.17  Robinson explains how Hamas, as a social 
movement, rapidly grew in popularity and strength during the first intifada of 1987–
1993.18  In each instance, the authors demonstrate how Islamic group gained both 
political and military power by using social movement concepts.19   
                                                 
11  Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis:  Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social 
Movements,” in Social Movements and Networks:  Relational Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 282–283.   
12  McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis,” 290.   
13  Hafez, “Why Muslims Rebel,” 21.   
14  Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2004), 5.   
15  David A. Snow and Susan E. Marshall, “Cultural Imperialism, Social Movements, and the Islamic 
Revival,” Research in Social Movements, Conflicts & Change 7 (1984):  141, http://search.ebscohost.com 
(accessed March 11, 2009).  
16  Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 97.   
17  Asef Bayat, “Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 6 
(September 2005): 904, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436590500089240 (accessed February 20, 2009).   
18  Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as a Social Movement” In Islamic Activism:  A Social Movement 
Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 130–134.   
19  SMT and Islamism is not limited to just the Middle East.  Leheny (2005) uses SMT to explain Al 
Qaeda’s affect on Southeast Asia.  
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Hafez’s approach helps to explain how an Islamist group can grow in power and 
influence.  It also explains how the regime’s methods of repression can fuel or smother 
Islamist violence.  Both of these factors are incredibly important.  However, there is little 
discussion on the population itself. His discussion leaves unanswered which conditions 
lead the population to accept violence as the best political solution.  How does a nascent 
insurgency tap into this discontent and grow in power and influence?  
In Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, Daniel Byman examines the initial 
conditions of a growing insurgency.  Byman argues that, through the judicious use of 
violence, a growing insurgency can establish relative superiority over the regime and 
control the local population.20  By becoming stronger than the state in this limited 
environment, the insurgency can gather resources and suppress opposition groups.   
An important task for the proto-insurgent is to find a balance between violence 
and influence.  If the insurgent is too violent, then it will alienate the population and 
attract the attention of the regime’s security forces.  If the insurgent is not violent enough, 
then the population will ignore it while the regime treats it as a criminal matter.21  
Ultimately, the insurgent wants to be the sole arbiter of violence within its haven.  In this 
circumstance, the insurgent can impose its political will on the populace, while taking 
control from the regime.  
The importance of violence as a political tool is well known.  Galula describes 
violence as the essential element in breaking a regime’s control over the local 
population.22  For O’Neill, violence is the difference between an insurgency and political 
protest.23  Gentry states that violence is often the result of radical social movements, 
                                                 
20  Daniel Byman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007): 
8, www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP178  (accessed March 10, 2009).   
21  Byman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, 8–9.   
22  David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare:  Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), 7.   
23  Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, 2005), 33.   
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which may lead to revolutionary or insurgent groups.24  Boyle describes violence as a 
form of signaling between the insurgent and the regime.25  In all cases, violence is the 
means through which an insurgent can directly influence both the target population and 
the regime.   
These theories are important for linking the causes of an insurgency to the 
behavior of political regime, the use of violence, and the attitude of the local population.  
None of these theories, however, address the means to which the local population shifts 
from passive compliance to active acceptance of the insurgent’s strategies and concepts.  
This acceptance, which will be called social embedding, represents a crucial element of 
modern conflict.   
C. DEFINING SOCIAL EMBEDDING 
Social embedding is a condition where the local population and an insurgency 
share the same goals and objectives in obtaining political control of their environment.  
This is in sharp contrast to when the insurgent intimidates the population to follow its 
orders. In the case of social embedding, the population willingly follows the insurgent’s 
directions and guidance, which may include everything from political protests to outright 
revolt.   
When social embedding takes place, the regime is faced with three broad choices.  
The first choice is to forcibly break the link between the insurgent and the population.  
Under such circumstances, the level of violence, and its political costs, will be high 
because the local population is willing to fight for the insurgent movement.  The second 
choice is to accept the insurgency’s existence.  This move could give the insurgency 
political legitimacy, which it could use to gain international approval and resources, and 
                                                 
24  Caron Gentry, “The Relationship between New Social Movement Theory and Terrorism Studies: 
The Role of Leadership, Membership, Ideology and Gender,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (April–
June 2004): 276, 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/09546550490483422 (accessed 
February 20, 2009).   
25  Michael Boyle, “Bargaining, Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Iraq 2004 
–2007,” Terrorism & Political Violence 21, no. 2 (April 2009): 270, 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/09546550902765565 (accessed 
August 20, 2009).   
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to continue to resist the regime.  Over time, popular legitimacy could lead to the third 
option:  the insurgency gaining a legitimate political voice in the regime’s government.  
This could lead to an erosion of regime legitimacy and a possible insurgent takeover.   
Social embedding is not a concept—it is a reality in the Middle East.  The 
Lebanese group Hezbollah is a socially embedded insurgency.  It has a sizeable military 
faction and implacable hostility to the United States and other Western influences.  
Within Lebanon, Hezbollah has strong domestic support for its social, religious, and 
political efforts.  Military efforts to destroy the movement (most recently in 2006) have 
only resulted in heavy civilian casualties, a weakening of the regime’s political influence, 
and international condemnation.26  Regionally, Hezbollah enjoys widespread popularity 
and substantial financial support.  Since 1992, Hezbollah party members have seats in the 
Lebanese government, thereby gaining legal political authority within the country.   
At the same time, social embedding is not a common event.  While Hezbollah has 
survived and thrived in Lebanon, armed groups such as Amal, FARL, and Ansar al-
Islam, which existed in the same environment, have become largely dormant.  More 
broadly, since the 1930s, over seventy separate insurgent groups have appeared across the 
Middle East. 27  However, only a handful ever became socially embedded.  If social 
embedding is such a powerful method for the sustainability of an insurgent movement, 
then why are there not more Hezbollahs?  The following will explore the conditions 
under which social embedding between insurgents and a population occurs.  
                                                 
26  Tobias Buck, “How a Nation Stumbled Into War,” Financial Times – London, July 7, 2008, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed September 2, 2008). 
27  Jane’s Information Group,  Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, http://search.janes.com 
(accessed February 7, 2009). 
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Figure 1.   Ideal Social Embedding Model 
This heuristic model for social embedding is based on the three tenets of social 
movement theory (SMT):  ideological framing, resource mobilization, and political 
opportunity.  I posit that the interplay between these three factors defines the space under 
which social embedding occurs.   
 9
The main players in this model are the primary political power (regime), the 
weaker political power (rival), and the target population (people).  Ideological framing 
shapes activity along the x-axis of time, while resource mobilization shapes activity along 
the y-axis of political capacity.  Political opportunities are events that change the status 
quo between the regime, insurgency, and the local population, which were reflected as an 
intersection between popular expectations and political capacity.   
Ideological framing is the ability of the regime—or its rival—to influence the 
people to support its cause.  Specifically, framing is the words, actions, and ideas that 
inspire the people to trust the political entity (whether regime or rival).  This trust gives 
the political group legitimacy, which in turn provides time to fulfill its promises.  A 
political group can also use violence as a framing tool.  The use of targeted violence for 
intimidation is an important tool for controlling the population.28  
Resource mobilization is the ability to gather goods and services to fulfill political 
goals.  These goods and services (which include money, intelligence, weapons, and 
personnel) translate into political capability.  For social embedding to occur, the political 
power must be capable of fulfilling the people’s expectations with its available resources.  
As the group fulfills expectations, then it gains more legitimacy, which allows it to 
increase its capability.  Likewise, failure to meet expectations will reduce legitimacy, 
which also affects the ability to increase resources.  This loss of legitimacy is particularly 
damaging to the state.29   
Political opportunity occurs when there is an intersection between popular 
expectations and political capability.  These events, which are discrete moments in time, 
represent a transition point between the political entities and the people.  The key 
characteristic is that the political opportunity is between the dominant political power and 
the people.  If the regime can effectively target an insurgent enemy, then the insurgency’s  
 
 
                                                 
28  Byman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, 8.   
29  Wiktorowicz, “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory,” 197.   
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growth is unlikely.  Likewise, if a regime is too weak or distracted to effectively target 
the insurgent, then the enemy will grow in power and influence.30  The rival power is an 
outsider to the interaction.   
While the rival can only observe the political opportunity, it is not powerless.  On 
the contrary, it has incredible influence on the interaction between the population and the 
regime.  The rival can use its resources and framing to reduce the regime’s capability 
and/or raise the people’s expectations over time.  The rival’s goal is to create the 
intersection between the regime’s falling or stagnant capability and the people’s rising 
expectations.  When the regime fails to meet the people’s needs, it enters the zone of the 
failing state (see Figure 1).  At this point, the rival can begin to meet the people’s 
expectations and gain legitimacy.   
When the rival power meets the people’s expectations, it enters the period of 
social embedding (see Figure 1).  Critical to this period is the shift in power:  the people 
now consider the rival more powerful than the regime.  This role reversal gives the rival 
political legitimacy and, more importantly, the initiative in dealing with the people.  
However, this power shift is relative:  the regime authority may have more power across 
the entire state, but it is weak in the rival’s enclave with the population.   
When social embedding begins, time favors the rival.  The longer the embedding 
period lasts, the more likely the people will fully embrace the rival and reject the 
regime’s authority.  With enough time, the rival can make its link to the people 
unbreakable.  Thus, it is critical for the regime to break the period of social embedding 
and force the people back into a failing state period.  Once that occurs, the regime can use 
its resources to restore its own legitimacy with the people.  However, it will also have to 
win back the people who committed to the rival while it controlled the environment.  
 
                                                 
30  Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 75–76.  
 11
E. APPLYING THE HEURISTIC MODEL TO THE STUDY OF 
INSURGENCIES 
This heuristic model for social embedding is a useful tool for understanding the 
success of embedded insurgencies.  By identifying distinctive actors, it allows analysts to 
focus on the most important stages of the insurgent environment.  In a multiple player 
environment, like Iraq and Afghanistan, such clarity will help to avoid conflating 
different groups and their objectives.  For example, in 2005, the term “Anti-Coalition 
Militants” was used to simultaneously describe Al Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al Sunnah, and 
1920 Revolutionary Brigades.  These three groups had fundamentally different strategies, 
tactics, and support bases, while coalition countermeasures for each group were 
different.31   
Additionally, identifying a common set of population needs will help to 
objectively compare regime and insurgent effectiveness on the population.  This study 
will use the five sets of needs that Jeffrey Kromer derived from Maslow’s Hierarchy of 
Needs:  Competition for Resources, Ensuring Safety and Security, Perpetuating 
Communal Integrity, Gaining Power and Prestige, and Continuing State 
Maturation/Advance Ideologies.32  This list is not the definitive means for comparing 
population objectives, but it defines a common set of objectives, and Maslow’s Hierarchy 
is both simple enough to remember and powerful enough to support detailed analysis.   
Finally, the model focuses analysis to a specific period of time.  Similar to 
lumping different insurgencies into one indiscriminate mass, attempting to explain a 
group over its entire lifespan weakens analysis.  I posit that every insurgency faces a 
critical point in its development when it either seized the initiative or failed to adapt.  
This period of action defines a socially embedded insurgency.   
The remainder of the thesis consists of case studies that examine insurgent groups 
through the lens of social embedding.  Chapter II discusses Lebanon’s Hezbollah, a 
                                                 
31  Jane’s Information Group, “Gulf State Terror Groups,” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 
http://search.janes.com (accessed March 5, 2009).   
32  Jeffrey B. Kromer, Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:  A New Paradigm, Analysis Tool, 
and US Air Force Role (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, [March 30, 2007]): 7, 
http://www.dtic.mil (accessed September 11, 2009). 
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highly embedded insurgency, and its development between 1982 and 1992.  Chapter III 
discusses Al Qaeda in Iraq, a socially rejected insurgency, and its rise and fall between 
2002 and 2008.  Chapter IV will discuss policy and strategy considerations in preventing 
the rise of socially embedded insurgencies, as well as options to deal with those already 
in existence.  
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II. HEZBOLLAH AS A SOCIALLY EMBEDDED INSURGENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Lebanese Group Hezbollah (Party of God) is one of the most feared and 
respected terrorist organizations in the Middle East.  Before Al Qaeda’s attack on 
September 11th, 2001, Hezbollah was responsible for more American deaths than any 
other organization.33  Even prior to the 2006 War, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
considers Hezbollah’s armed wing, the Islamic Resistance (IR) the most formidable 
military unit it has ever faced. 34  Finally, in addition to its military strength, Hezbollah 
wields significant political power through its 14 parliamentary seats and an enviable 
social services sector.35   
However, Hezbollah was not born as a socially embedded insurgency.  In 1982, 
AMAL, founded by the revered Shiite leader Musa al Sadr, was the dominant Shia 
political group in Lebanon.  Hezbollah, on the other hand, was an unknown group of 
disgruntled AMAL radicals.  By 1992, Hezbollah would be the dominant Shia political 
and military organization, while AMAL would be on the decline.  How did Hezbollah 
transform from a minor presence to a socially embedded insurgency in only ten years?   
This chapter argues that Hezbollah’s popular success came from a variety of 
political, social, and military decisions in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
southern Lebanon.  Adopting the role of Shia protector, Hezbollah was able to provide 
for its people in a way that neither AMAL nor the government could match.  In addition, 
Hezbollah was able to adjust its ideology to take advantage of critical political 
opportunities after the 1989 Taif Accords.   When the 1992 parliamentary elections 
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arrived, Hezbollah would be in position to emerge as the dominant representative of 
Lebanon’s Shia—and virtually impossible to remove from the environment.   
B. IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
In order to understand Hezbollah’s rise, it is essential to understand Lebanese 
society prior to the 1975–1989 civil war.  In those times, as now, Lebanon divided 
political power among the three largest confessional groups (in order of size):  Christian 
Maronites, Sunnis and Shia.  Historically, the government tended to neglect the Shia, 
which were concentrated in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, and far from the 
capital city of Beirut.  However, between 1948 and 1975, the Shia population exploded 
from an estimated 225,000 to nearly 750,000.  This represented a demographic shift from 
17% to nearly 30% of the country’s population in less than 30 years.36  This explosive 
growth overwhelmed the labor and services in southern Lebanon, so thousands of Shia 
moved to the cities, especially to the crowded slums of Beirut.   
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Figure 2.   Lebanon’s distribution of communities (estimated) in 1983.37 
When the Shia only lived in their own enclaves, there was little to no interaction 
with the Sunni or Christian population.  With their arrival in the capital region, there were 
increased contacts between the different confessional groups, where the Shia recognized 
their political and economic disadvantages.38  With a growing professional class, a 
migrant middle class, and an industrial working class, Shia began to question the political 
status quo.39  Unfortunately, the Shia were still a rural population with a politically naïve 
leadership.  It would take a strong leader to confront the confessional system and bring 
the Shia to political parity with the other population groups.  
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Political isolation ended with the arrival of an Iranian-born cleric named Musa al-
Sadr.  Sadr moved to Tyre in 1959 and assumed the post of Shia mufti after the death of 
Sayyid Sharif al-Din.40  A mujtahid (a Shia religious scholar), Sadr received his religious 
education in the Shiite holy cities of Qom and Najaf, and understood the Shia narrative of 
suffering, oppression, and deprivation.41  Over time, Sadr redirected the Shia worldview 
from victimhood towards a new purpose:  political activism in order to save themselves 
from the government’s incompetence and complacency.42  Through his speeches and 
personal example, Sadr established the framework for Shiite activism, resulting in the 
creation of Harakar al-Mahrumin, or Movement of the Dispossessed.43   
The Movement’s political program had five major demands of the government.  
First, Lebanon needed gradual reform of the confessional system in order to properly 
represent Shiite interests.  Second, a chamber of religious leaders was necessary to work 
alongside the parliament to ensure a balance between the sects.  Third, the electoral laws 
needed amending in order to properly represent the changing demographics in the 
country.  Fourth, the country’s political climate needed a cleansing of corruption and 
immorality.  Finally, Shia- dominated southern Lebanon needed economic development 
to bring it up to par with the rest of the country.44  Sadr believed that, if the country 
would implement these reforms, then the Shia would have a fair place in the country’s 
politician and economic future.   
While Sadr did not promote political violence, he did believe in the concept of 
self-defense, saying, “If the government fails to perform its duty, it is still the people’s 
duty to defend themselves.”45  Thus, Sadr formed the Movement’s military wing, 
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AMAL, in 1974.46  AMAL would serve as the armed defender for the Shia when the 
Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975.  During the early phases (1975–1979), AMAL 
focused on protecting the Shia south from Israeli-backed Christian militias and other 
armed threats.47  AMAL also gained support from the growing Shia middle class of 
business people and professionals.48   Heavy Shia casualties at the hands of the Maronite 
militias consolidated AMAL’s support, as well as hardening Shia enmity against the 
Maronites’ Israeli supporters.49   
In less than six years, Sadr’s Movement had earned over 80% support among the 
Shia, effectively displacing all other political groups for primacy.50  In May 1975, Sadr’s 
Movement consolidated control of the Shia political establishment by forcing out 
Lebanon’s speaker of parliament Kamal As’ad.  This was a significant act because As’ad 
represented the traditional, passive, and politically isolated Shia leadership.51  The 
Movement of the Dispossessed, under Sadr’s vision, was the new, unified, and ascendant 
voice of the Shia within Lebanon.   
However, Musa al-Sadr and AMAL would not capitalize on this newfound unity.  
Sadr disappeared during a trip to Libya in 1978, and his remains were never found.  His 
loss would send AMAL into an ideological crisis. AMAL would abandon its Islamic 
activism, while “proposing a democratic pluralism based on intersectarian consensus.”52  
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 would re-ignite the Shia population, while setting the 
stage for the creation of a new organization to replace AMAL.   
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C. 1982:  THE ISRAELI  INVASION AND OCCUPATION 
In 1979, less than a year after Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance, another Shia 
religious leader dominated the world stage.  Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, at the 
forefront of a popular revolution in Iran, overthrew the US- backed Shah Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi.  This was not only the first Islamic revolution in modern times; it was the 
first successful Shia-backed resistance movement since the fall of the Umayyad Dynasty 
in the 8th Century CE.53  The subsequent hostage crisis at the American Embassy in 
Tehran led to a freezing of relations between the US and Iran.54   
After Khomeini’s victory in Tehran, he turned his attention to Beirut.  Khomeini 
was familiar with the Shia situation in Lebanon, and knew their spiritual leader, Musa al 
Sadr.  In the 1930s, he studied in Najaf with Sadr, along with a number of Lebanese and 
Iranian clerics.55  During Khomeini’s exile in Iraq and France, he monitored the events in 
Lebanon with great interest.  For example, in February 1978, Khomeini criticized US and 
Israeli policies towards Lebanon, stating that they had reduced Lebanon to “its present 
miserable state.”56   When the Grand Ayatollah took power in 1979, he inserted the 
concept of “regime support to the Lebanese Shia” into the new Iranian constitution.57   
On the other hand, the Iranian Revolution created a crisis within AMAL.  After 
Sadr’s disappearance, Nabi Berri, a well-to-do lawyer, became the new leader.  Berri was 
neither a pious pragmatist (like Sadr) nor a devout firebrand (like Khomeini).  Under his 
leadership, AMAL would embrace “many ideological currents and disagreements” while 
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failing to adhere to Sadr’s religious foundation.58  This constant shifting of ideas and 
concepts was unsettling to some of AMAL’s more pious supporters.   
Fortunately for these dissenters, a new religious leader emerged in the form of 
Sayyid Muhammad Fadlallah.  A contemporary with Sadr, he assumed a role of spiritual 
guide for many Shia, but never joined AMAL or any other organization.59  While he 
promoted religious coexistence (like Sadr), he also promoted the armed struggle against 
Islam’s enemies, like Israel.60  Fadlallah’s messages helped to strengthen the spiritual 
group and convinced them to try a new path.     
The new path would appear in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
southern Lebanon.  Known as Operation Peace for Galilee, Israeli forces invaded 
Lebanon with the goal of denying the PLO sanctuary in Lebanon.  In less than three 
months, the IDF successfully drove over 14,000 Palestinian fighters and Syrian soldiers 
out of southern Lebanon.  In addition, Bahir Gemayel, a Maronite ally of Israel, became 
the new Lebanese president.  Finally, the Israelis occupied the Litani River valley and 
controlled all of southern Lebanon.61  
The Israeli invasion radicalized many AMAL supporters, while the Shia 
population soured on the occupation forces.  In less than a year, over 10,000 Lebanese 
and Palestinian men were in Israeli-controlled jails.62  Additionally, over 80 percent of 
the villages in southern Lebanon suffered combat damage, with seven others nearly 
destroyed.63  However, Berri and the Lebanese government did not confront the Israelis.  
On the contrary, Berri collaborated with President Gemayel on the National Salvation 
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Council, which supported the pro-Israeli Maronite militia.64  AMAL, the armed group 
who was supposed to protect the Shia, was unwilling to confront the Israelis.  The AMAL 
defectors were ready to fight.  
Although Iran was engaged in a bloody war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, 
Khomeini jumped at the opportunity to spread the Islamic Revolution to Lebanon.  
Stating that it would be more efficient to “prepare and equip them [the Lebanese] to 
defend their own country against Israel”65 than to send Iranian units, Khomeini sent 1500 
Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) to the Bekaa Valley in southern Lebanon.66  Throughout 
the war, the Pasdaran would provide training and intelligence targeting to Hezbollah 
operatives.67  
In addition to Iranian assistance, Syria also supported the resistance effort.  As a 
matter of realpolitick, Syria supported any Lebanese militias that fought the Israelis.  
Therefore, Damascus allowed Iran to build a base in the Syrian town of Zabadani, which 
facilitated Pasdaran movement to the Bekaa Valley.68  The provision of a safe haven was 
essential to Hezbollah’s birth and early development.   
Thus, a disparate of “alienated AMAL members, Islamic Amal, individual clerics 
and their followings, the Lebanese Da’wa, the Association of Muslim ulema in Lebanon, 
and the Association of Muslim Students,”69 combined with a cohort of Iranian 
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such as Hassan Nasrallah, Abbas al-Musawi, Raghib Harb, and Subhi al-Tufayli, were 
only in their 20s and 30s.70  Hizbollah’s founding was secret, and it would not announce 
itself officially until 1984.71   
From the beginning, the Party of God had higher and more significant objectives 
than the other militias fighting Israeli occupation.  Hezbollah’s founding principle was its 
commitment to Islam and the Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisconsult (Vilayat-I 
Faqih).72  Unlike other groups that held secular or temporal goals, Hezbollah was born 
with a commitment to Iran’s revolution.  In essence, Hezbollah was dedicated to bringing 
the rule of God to the Muslim world.    
However, contrary to popular perceptions, this commitment was not universal.  In 
Hezbollah’s founding document, the so-called Manifesto of the Nine, the party limited 
itself to operating “within a Lebanese context and in accord with Lebanese realities.”73  
Despite the allegiance to Khomeini, nationalist goals had priority over pan-Islamic 
issues.74 
By 1984, the singular nationalist goal for Hezbollah was to drive Israel and its 
supporters out of Lebanon.  At that point, Israeli forces had killed over 19,000 Lebanese 
and wounded an additional 32,000.75  The invaders killed thousands of Shia, while 
displacing thousands more from the region.  These refugees often ended up in Palestinian 
camps or in Beirut’s slums.76  To Hezbollah, armed violence was the only way to respond 
to Israeli aggression.   
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To carry out military operations, Hezbollah created the Islamic Resistance (IR) 
and the Islamic Jihad (IJ).  Both organizations were not standing armies, but trained 
combatants that would fight when Hezbollah requested their help.77  Islamic Jihad carried 
out traditional conventional attacks against the Israelis, and was therefore not much 
different than any other militia.  Islamic Jihad was also responsible for the kidnapping 
spree in Beirut and the highjacking of TWA flight 847.78   
On the other hand, Islamic Resistance introduced an entirely new phenomenon:  a 
martyrdom, or suicide bombing, corps.  Form their first attack on November 11, 1982 
(Ahmad Kassir’s attack of an Israeli outpost in Tyre) to their 1983 attacks on the 
American and French barracks in Beirut; suicide bombing was a powerful and effective 
weapon. 79  As a sign of effectiveness, international peacekeepers left Beirut shortly after 
the barracks bombings, which killed over 300 American and French service members. 80   
In spite of its extreme violence, Hezbollah had a clear rationale behind their 
methods. As stated before, two of Hezbollah’s major goals were to drive out the Israeli 
occupiers and establish an Islamic state.   In the chaos of the civil war, bombings and 
kidnappings were effective tools to accomplish these feats.  However, unlike other 
militant Islamist groups that tend to ignore the civilian / military divide, Hezbollah 
“principally targeted combatants in its military operations.”81  Additionally, and most 
interesting, there are no proven Hezbollah suicide attacks after the Western armies left 
1985 until the war ended in 1990.82  
This pragmatism came from the group’s Operational Code.  In essence, the Code 
helped Hezbollah operatives to plan, respond, and rationalize violent acts based on Shiite 
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beliefs.  The code prioritized kidnapping victims, methods of torture, and a code of 
conduct in treating prisoners.  Here are a few examples:   
 30 of 38 possible prisoner categories were off limits for torture, execution, or 
pursuit upon escape.  
 34 of 38 categories were off limits were off limits for unwarranted assassination.   
 Shooting an escaping prisoner in the back was considered dishonorable 
 Providing medical assistance to prisoners was acceptable 
 Military intelligence officers, diplomats, American citizens, and Israeli citizens 
were preferred hostages.83 
Beyond the overt use of violence, Hezbollah recognized the fact that the Shia 
were suffering tremendously during the Israeli occupation and civil war.  Thus, they 
provided what the Lebanese government could not:  social services.  Providing assistance 
in lieu of the government was not unusual in Lebanon.  The civil war has destroyed any 
semblance of order, and each sectarian group wanted to expand its power within its 
confessional group.  Thus, any type of aid and development that a group gave to the 
people was useful.   
The Hezbollah difference, though, was the unmatched scale and organization that 
it brought to the effort.  Between 1982 and 1986, Hezbollah set up Jihad al-Binaa (Holy 
Reconstruction Organ) with approximately $90 million of Iranian funds.  It provided a 
wide variety of services, from medical care and financial aid to housing and public 
utilities.84  In the process, Hezbollah “provided a higher quality of services to some 
communities in the midst of a civil war than the same communities received during 
[peacetime] from the Lebanese state.”85   
Throughout the conflict, Iran would contribute mightily to Hezbollah’s social 
coffers, to the tune of $60 million a year.  With these funds, Hezbollah built two major  
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hospitals in southern Lebanon in 1986, which supported an array of pharmacies and 
medical centers in the region.86  Hezbollah also repaired over 1000 homes damaged by 
Israeli and other attacks.87    
The combination of violence, social services, and clear ideology served Hezbollah 
well throughout the war.  In the face of an impotent government, Hezbollah not only 
protected its charges, it provided a higher level of service and support in the midst of a 
civil war than the government ever did.88  However, there were still some radical 
elements within the party.  It would take the death of a leader—and the end of a war—to 
deal with that issue.  
D. 1989:  THE VISIBLE SHIFT TOWARDS PRAGMATISM 
In 1989, two important events would have a significant impact on Hezbollah’s 
ideology and direction.  The first event took place in June, the Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini died in Tehran.  He was a vocal and powerful ally to Hezbollah, and his 
support inspired the radical wing of the organization.  Khomeini’s successor, Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, became President after winning 85% of the popular vote.  He immediately 
refocused Iran from spreading the revolution to rebuilding its economy in the aftermath 
of the Iran-Iraq War.89  In all likelihood, it appeared that Iran would take a far less 
ideological stance towards Hezbollah.90   
Second, the Lebanese Civil War ended with the ratification of the Taif Accord in 
October 1989.  This Syrian-backed agreement reestablished a Lebanese government 
based on the confessional system from the 1943 National Pact.91  Additionally, Syria  
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would assume a protective role over the broken Lebanese state.  This implied the 
disarming of all militias, to include Hezbollah.92  To enforce the new mandate, Damascus 
kept nearly 35,000 troops in Beirut.93    
Hezbollah’s military prowess, religious dedication, and services capability had 
displaced AMAL from its role as Shia guardian.  However, in compliance with the Taif 
Accord, the group’s armed wings had to disarm.  This call to disarm flew in the face of 
several unpleasant facts.  Thousands of armed Israeli troops remained in the Litani River 
valley, using it as a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel.  The other Lebanese militia 
groups, which would not demobilize without Hezbollah, could restart the conflict and 
plunge the nation back into war.  Finally, the Syrian Army was powerful enough to 
disarm Hezbollah by force, while simultaneously punishing the Shia community in the 
process.  
Hezbollah now faced a crossroad: either maintain the ideological banner of 
Khomeini or accept a more pragmatic route to protect the Shia.  The answer would come 
in an extraordinary meeting in Tehran in November 1989.  The radicals, led by Sheik 
Tufayl, advocated a “perpetual jihad” against the opponents of an Islamist Lebanon.94  
The moderates advocated integration in the confessional system.95  Rafsanjani, the 
Iranian president, sided with the pragmatists and Hezbollah decided to accept the Taif 
Accords.  The group’s new goal:  to become a viable political party in time for the 1992 
parliamentary elections.   
This choice came with an emotional price.  Hezbollah was founded with the goal 
of creating an Islamic Republic of Lebanon.  By abandoning this goal, the members were 
admitting that this was no longer feasible.96  However, this was a realistic assessment.  
The group’s leaders realized that a true Islamic state had to come by the will of the 
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people.  Any effort to impose such a result would only reignite the civil war.97  The best 
way to influence the will of people would not come from violence, but from controlling 
the levers of government.98 
On the topic of the elections, Hezbollah faced a significant problem:  how would 
it convince the Lebanese people, particularly non-Shia, that it would be an honest player 
in politics?  Here, Hezbollah would use their strong existing social network to gain 
support.  Using its hospitals and schools as examples, Hezbollah displayed itself as “the 
part of general political and social resurrection.”99  This network of social services had an 
impact far beyond the Shia communities.  Other groups noticed how Hezbollah provided 
valuable services and food aid during the post-war period—services that the central 
government and other groups did not.100  “If Hezbollah can provide such good 
governance now,” the thought probably went, “then how would they do if they were part 
of the government?”  
Secondly, Hezbollah created a massive voter database and built extensive 
candidate lists.  With this knowledge, it ran different candidate lists, both party and 
independent, in order to maximize the candidate’s impact and potential to win.101  
Finally, Hezbollah decided to nominate a fixed number of candidates and leave vacant 
places for non-party members.  This would allow the Party to negotiate and compromise 
with the political powers in each district to fill these seats.102  By leaving seats open in 
Hezbollah-strong districts, the party could strengthen its hand while simultaneously 
weakening AMAL, the other Shia party participating in the elections.   
On Election Day 1992, Hezbollah won a 14-seat coalition in the 148-seat 
Lebanese parliament, making it the first Islamist party outside of Iran to win a nation-
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wide election.103  Hezbollah now had legitimate political power, both in the parliament 
and in the cabinet, to back up the social and military strength it had gained over the 
1980s.  The Party of God had arrived.   
E.  ANALYSIS 
How does Hezbollah’s growth fit into the social embedding model?   
 
 
Figure 3.   Hezbollah in the SEI Model 
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Hezbollah’s path to social embedding began long before 1982.  The foundations 
were set under the confessional system of pre-war Lebanon.  The 1943 National Accord 
created a division of political power among Maronites, Sunnis, and Shia, based on 
numbers from the 1932 census.  The Shia, who were located in southern Lebanon and the 
Bekaa Valley, were the smallest group in the census, and received the smallest share of 
power.  Additionally, their population bases were in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa 
Valley, locations far from the centers of power in Beirut.  
This lack of political power showed up in many ways.  While Lebanon’s economy 
thrived before 1975, the Shias saw little of it.  There was virtually no development in the 
Shia dominated area, and the job market was primarily agrarian and rural.   Maronite 
commanders dominated the military, while the Shia served as ground troops.  Finally, the 
population explosion did nothing to improve the Shia’s role in government.  For the Shia, 
Lebanon was a failing state, represented in the gold-shaded section on the graph.  
In this environment, it is easy to understand how Musa al-Sadr gained power and 
prestige among the population.  He was able to unify the Shia into a collective voice, 
giving them the opportunity to influence political affairs in Lebanon.  His Movement of 
the Dispossessed provided a rallying cry for rights and dignity for the population.  
AMAL would provide the armed might to protect the people.  Sadr would provide the 
vision and leadership.  This combination would increase the Shia’s expectations from the 
government, but the government would never meet those needs.   
When the Lebanese civil war began, the popular expectations shifted to ensuring 
security and safety.  The government in Beirut, over time, lost more and more capacity to 
provide this basic need for the Shia.  The situation worsened when Sadr disappeared in 
1978.  As Nabi Berri tried to lead AMAL in a sectarian direction, the group slowly lost 
respect and prestige amongst the Shia.  
The first political opportunity appeared in 1982, when Israel began Operation 
Peace for Galilee.  The Shia, who already had little trust in their government, expected 
Beirut to demand an Israeli withdrawal or, at the very least, send troops to protect the 
Shia villages in southern Lebanon.  When the government appeared to collaborate with 
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the Israelis and the Maronite militias, the Shias clearly broke from the government.  This 
break is illustrated in Political Opportunity (PO) #1 in Figure 2.  
The Ayatollah Khomeini was able to exploit this rift between the Shia and the 
government.  He provided trainers and funding for the disgruntled AMAL members who 
would form the core of Hezbollah.  Syria contributed by allowing the young militia to 
safely train on its soil.  During those first two years, Hezbollah was able to build political 
capacity through military training and a singular focus:  to drive the Israelis out of 
Lebanon.   
When Hezbollah burst on the scene in late 1983 with a series of attacks on Israeli 
and Western forces, they demonstrated the ability to fight for the Shia.  This dramatic 
arrival convinced many Shia that Hezbollah would protect them, while AMAL and the 
government would not.  Hezbollah’s actions represent PO #2 in Figure 2.   
Hezbollah, with Iranian support, was able to back up its actions with support.  
Through the Martyr’s Foundation, Hezbollah paid over $90 million to the families of 
IR/IJ fighters between 1982 and 1986.104  Jihad al Binaa, the reconstruction agency, built 
two major hospitals, schools, mosques, and an array of other projects in Shia areas.105  
These efforts successfully consolidated support among the Shia population, represented 
by the period of social embedding (shaded red) on the graph.   
1989 was a pivotal year for Hezbollah.  The combination of the Taif Accords and 
Khomeini’s death threatened to cut off both the military and reconstruction arms of 
Hezbollah.  This was a political opportunity for Hezbollah because the people’s 
expectations had risen to the level of the Party’s capacity—after years of having safety, 
security, and communal integrity, the Shia now expected to have a stronger voice in the 
government.  Hezbollah now had a choice:  if it refused to disarm, then the Party would 
risk losing popular support if it reignited the war.  However, if the Party disarmed while 
the Israelis were still in the south, then it could no longer protect the Shia, and would 
suffer a massive loss of legitimacy.  This critical point is PO #3 on Figure 2.  
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What saved Hezbollah from ideological crisis—the same crisis that doomed 
AMAL—was the 1989 Tehran Conclave with President Rafsanjani.  When he and the 
Hezbollah moderates chose to stand in the 1992 Parliamentary elections, the path became 
clear.  Hezbollah could use its massive community network to win legitimate political 
power in the central government.  This act would give Hezbollah the ability to influence 
Lebanese politics from within the government, while simultaneously giving the Shia an 
unprecedented level of power and prestige.    
Israel played an unwitting role in Hezbollah’s success.  If the IDF had left 
southern Lebanon after the Taif Accord, then Hezbollah would have lost its reason to 
keep its weapons.  If the Islamic Resistance were unarmed, then the Shia would have had 
to depend on the government for safety and security.  This would have diluted 
Hezbollah’s power, and may have given the Lebanese government a chance to reengage 
the Shia and fight for legitimacy.   
That scenario never came to pass.  When the IDF continued their occupation of 
southern Lebanon, Hezbollah continued its armed resistance in the south in order to 
protect the Shia.  This move confirmed, once again, that the central government was 
incapable or unwilling to protect the Shia.  Hezbollah, on the other hand, was both 
willing and able, thus further consolidating Hezbollah’s political power, while seriously 
damaging the government’s legitimacy with the Shia.  
By the time the 1992 elections arrived, Hezbollah was ready.  The government in 
Beirut had worked hard to gain popular support and stage internationally accepted 
elections.  Every faction was committed to rebuilding Lebanon and forming a viable 
political entity.  On the model, the government was working to build communal integrity 
and attempting to increase power and prestige in the eyes of its people.   
None of Beirut’s efforts, though, mattered to the Shia.  Over the previous decade, 
the Shia saw that Beirut did not care for their needs or expectations.  Hezbollah had shed 
blood to protect Shia families.  Hezbollah had spent millions to rebuild homes, schools, 
hospitals, and roads.  Hezbollah had chosen to participate in the elections in order to give 
the Shia a tangible level of power and prestige within the central government.  
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Hezbollah’s actions over the decade had embedded the group deeply into Shia society, 
and both parts depended on each other for survival, support and success.  Thus, only 
Hezbollah would win the majority of the Shia vote in 1992, thus becoming an intractable 
part of Lebanon’s body politic.  
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III. AL QAEDA IN IRAQ’S FAILURE TO SOCIALLY EMBED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was born in October 2004, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
the leader of Tawhid wah Jihad, swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and his global 
jihadist movement.106  A salafi organization with a large number of foreign fighters, AQI 
became one of the most lethal insurgent groups in Iraq.  Using suicide bombers as its 
primary weapon, AQI conducted hundreds of attacks from 2004–2008, and claimed 
responsibility for over 1,000 civilian deaths.107   
However, the Iraqi people never fully embraced AQI, particularly their call for 
sectarian warfare.  The Sunni tribes of Anbar Province, who originally welcomed the 
group’s insurgent violence, eventually rejected Zarqawi and his followers.  AQI’s failure 
to embed socially would lead to the group’s defeat at the hands of a US–Sunni alliance in 
2007.  The loss of Anbar Province as a safe haven would permanently cripple AQI’s 
abilities in Iraq.  As of the fall of 2009, AQI is still active, but it is no longer a major 
threat to Iraq’s long-term security and stability.108   
This chapter will argue that AQI’s violent ideology and actions did not succeed in 
promoting social embedding among the Sunni tribes.  On the contrary, AQI’s strategy 
accelerated the group’s isolation from its Sunni hosts.  A combination of strict religious 
dogma, cultural and economic violations, and coercive enforcement would create enmity 
between AQI operatives and the region’s powerful tribal leaders.  The rise of the Anbar 
Awakening and Salvation Councils in the fall of 2006 would both mark the end of Al 
Qaeda’s reign in the province and its declining influence across Iraq. 
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B. IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS  
Ahmed Fadel al Khalaylah, better known as Abu Musab al Zarqawi, was a 
relatively uneducated man, with no formal Islamic training.  However, his ideology, 
which combined religious fervor with violent action, profoundly shaped AQI’s formation, 
recruiting, and activities.  Zarqawi’s ideology rotated around four major tenets:  
resistance to an apostate regime, destruction of ignorance through offensive jihad, 
influence over the media environment, and the binding obligation for all Muslims to fight 
the enemies of Islam.   
The first concept was resistance to apostasy (the abandonment or renunciation of 
a religious belief).  Apostasy is common across many religions, but carries particular 
strength in Islam, where there is a long history of foreign rulers who claimed adherence 
to the faith, but refused to uphold its tenets.  This idea goes back to the 13th Century, 
when the Mongol Emperor Ghazan reduced Syrian resistance to his forces by claiming 
that, “Muslims should not fight each other, and that I am a Muslim.”  During that period, 
the scholar Ibn Taymiyyah accused Ghazan of apostasy because, while Ghazan had 
recited the shahadah, he refused to enforce Islamic law in his kingdom.109   For Ibn 
Taymiyyah, apostates like Ghazan were a deadly threat, and it was necessary for true 
Muslims to resist these rulers by “all necessary steps.”  These steps should include war, 
“even if they contravened the letter of Islamic law.”110  War against an apostate ruler is 
not against Islam; instead, destroying the apostate will ensure that man can live freely 
under the rule of God.  
The second concept espoused by Zarqawi was offensive jihad (struggle) against 
jahilliyah (state of ignorance).  Jahilliyah is a common Islamic concept that Sayyid Qutb 
popularized in his book, Milestones.  Qutb defined jahiliyya as “one man’s lordship over 
another [that] always takes the form of ... a society that which has its own leadership, its 
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own concepts and values, and its own traditions, habits, and feelings.”111  Qutb argues 
that this ignorance directly counters the Qur’an, which states all men must submit to the 
will and law of Allah and reject the lordship of man.112  Qutb further asserted that the 
only way to resist jahiliyya is through jihad, or struggle.  Specifically, Qutb advocates 
offensive jihad as a means to “wipe out tyranny and to introduce true freedom to 
mankind.”  Additionally, Qutb saw the defense of Islam as “defend against those 
elements that limit man’s freedom.”113  
Zarqawi displayed his dedication to jihad with his murder of Nicholas Berg on 
May 11, 2004.  Prior to beheading Mr. Berg, Zarqawi extolled the virtues of jihad to the 
audience, as well as the righteousness of his actions: 
O Scholars, aren’t you full to the point of saturation from attending 
conferences and rhetorical games?  Don’t you think it’s time to get on the 
path of jihad and carry the sword, with which came the master of the 
prophets [?]  We ask you not to get involved, as you are accustomed to, 
and not to denounce what we will do, just to satisfy the U.S.114   
 
The third concept promoted by AQI was the importance of influencing the media.  
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Osama bin Laden’s 
second-in-command, learned first-hand about the power of influence.  During the Soviet–
Afghan War, Zawahiri wrote inspirational pamphlets highlighting the war effort in 
support of Abdullah Azzam and the Afghan Arabs.  These pamphlets inspired both 
fighters in the field and recruits on the home front.115  In 1993, after Zawahiri returned to 
Egypt, an EIJ bomb targeting Prime Minister Atef Sidqi killed a 12-year-old girl named  
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Shayma.  The Mubarak government used the media to highlight the incident and inflame 
popular anger against EIJ.  The information campaign succeeded in driving Zawahiri and 
his followers out of Egypt.116 
The fourth held by AQI is fard al-ayn, or the individual and binding obligation on 
all Muslims to wage jihad in defense of the faith.  Osama bin Laden, as the leader of the 
global Al Qaeda movement, highlighted this idea in his 1998 with, “The World Islamic 
Front’s Declaration to wage Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders.”  This essay laid out 
the various crimes that the United States has committed against Muslims, ranging from 
occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places (Saudi Arabia) to the murder of “millions” 
of Muslims by the “Jewish-Crusader alliance.”117  Bin Laden equated the killing of 
Americans to a religious duty, stated all Muslims should “kill Americans and seize their 
money wherever and whenever you find them.”118  
Additionally, Bin Laden believed that a true Muslim must commit himself to 
obeying and enforcing Islamic law.  He explained this idea in his 2002 essay entitled, 
“Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West.”  This work, which was a response to the 
Saudi intellectuals who wrote, “How Can We Coexist,” stated that sharia law “provides a 
true and just path, securing Muslims, and providing peace to the world.”  Bin Laden also 
argues that Muslims cannot obey sharia and live with the West, because “The West of a 
surety knows this path [of Islamic law] and battles us because of it.”119  Bin Laden also 
targets those who attempt to negotiate with the West, calling them “backstabbers” who 
reject sharia and the mujahidin who defend it.120  
All of these ideas shaped Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq. 
In 1989, Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan, arriving shortly after the departure of the 
Soviet army.  A year later, he traveled to Peshawar and joined the Arab-Afghan Bureau, 
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which was under the control of Osama bin Laden.  In Peshawar, Zarqawi would meet and 
befriend Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, a distinguished radical Salafi thinker.  Al Maqdisi 
would teach Zarqawi about the tenets of modern Salafism, which included the concepts 
of apostasy, jihad, and unity under Islamic law.121 
Zarqawi founded Tawhid wah Jihad in Iraq with several goals in mind, which he 
explained in a 2004 letter to Zawahiri.  First, Zarqawi wanted to drive out the Americans 
in order to stop the creation of a “greater Israel.”  Zarqawi said, “[the] Zionized American 
Administration believes that accelerating the creation of the State of [Greater] Israel will 
accelerate the coming of the Messiah.”122  Zarqawi considered the Americans weak and 
easy to fight because, “[the Americans] do not know the land or the situation of the 
mujahedeen because [American] intelligence is weak, especially since we know full well 
that the crusader force will pull out very soon.”123  
Zarqawi’s second objective was to create an Islamic state within the borders of 
Iraq.  The Iraqi Sunni complicated this matter because of a lack of spiritual leadership 
and fortitude.  Zarqawi explained,  
[The Sunni] are more lost than sheep among the wolves.  They have no 
guide and wander in the desert of gullibility and neglect, divided and 
fragmented, without a leader capable of bringing them together and 
preserving the best of them.124   
This lack of passion, in turn, denied Zarqawi safe havens from which to train and 
deploy his fighters.  He continued,  
The only thing preventing us from declaring a general mobilization is that 
this country has no mountains in which to seek refuge and no forests in 
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Many Iraqis have shown us hospitality and see us as brothers, but when it 
comes to making their home a base for launching operations, this is rarer 
than gold.125   
The best way to inspire the Sunni was to fight.  However, unlike the other 
insurgent groups, Zarqawi was not content just to fight the Americans.  He also wanted to 
attack the heretics to Islam:  the Shia and their Sunni collaborators: 
But the other enemy, made of heretics [Shia] and the Sunnis on their 
payroll, is ultimately the real danger that we face, because these are 
compatriots:  they know our hiding places and are far more cunning then 
their crusader masters…Evil resides in them:  they are the secret cause of 
our distress; they are the worm in the apple.  “They are the enemies; so 
beware of them.”126   
Victory in the struggle was a matter of life and death for AQI.  In Zarqawi’s mind, 
this was an existential struggle, and there was a mistake to refrain from extreme violence. 
Zarqawi indicated this thought at the end of his letter to Al Qaeda’s leadership:   
Either we fight them …or we pack up and go in search of another land.  
This is why I say again that the only solution for us is to strike the 
heretics, whether they are men of religion, soldiers, or others, until they 
submit to the Sunnis.  You might object that it is too soon, or unfair to 
throw the nation into a battle for which it is unprepared; that this will 
cause losses and spill blood; but that is precisely what we want.127 
These four concepts were important to Zarqawi for practical reasons.  Zarqawi 
had no secondary or religious education.  He was a fighter who “loved jihad, and did not 
have the patience to learn, teach, or preach.”128   However, he understood salafi doctrine 
well enough that he could quote Ibn Taymiyyah and the Qur’an in his letters and 
speeches: 
Ibn Taymiyyah—after describing the anathema they pronounced against 
the Muslims—was right to say: ‘This is why they help the unbelievers 
against the Muslims.  They were the main reason for the arrival of  
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Genghis Khan, the king of the unbelievers, in the lands of Islam, Hulagu’s 
arrival in Iraq, the taking of Aleppo, the pillage of Salihiyya, and other 
things.129  
The foreign fighters that supported AQI would respect Zarqawi’s apparent piety.   
More importantly, the foreign fighters understood this observation:  a Muslim 
country was under occupation by a foreign power, which was also supporting the rule of 
an apostate regime.  It was the responsibility of each Muslim to fight the invaders, and 
the struggle must be seen by the world in order to inspire more of the faithful to join the 
effort.  This practical ideology gave Zarqawi power and influence, and gave him the 
chance to build a violent movement after the fall of the Saddam regime.    
C. 2003:  THE INVASION OF IRAQ AND THE RISE OF THE SUNNI 
INSURGENCY 
On 20 March 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom began when the American-led 
coalition crossed the Kuwaiti border.130  The invasion’s operational concept was quite 
simple:  use speed and firepower to quickly overwhelm the Iraqi Army and reach 
Baghdad.  The coalition was able to travel quickly up the Tigris River valley against 
limited conventional resistance.  Coalition troops captured the southern oil fields before 
Saddam loyalists could destroy the facilities and create an environmental catastrophe.  By 
May 2003, US forces had captured Baghdad, and Saddam Hussein was out of power.   
Unfortunately, coalition planning did not account for the possibility of an 
insurgency rising from Saddam’s defeat.  The Saddam fedayeen, an irregular militia of 
regime loyalists, began to harass coalition supply lines and rear areas shortly after the 
invasion.131  The inability to contain and eliminate these small units would later haunt the 
coalitions’ efforts at consolidation and reorganization, while giving the Iraqis the 
impression that the coalition could not control the militias. 
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The perception of poor coalition control gained credibility after the Saddam 
Hussein regime, and any form of governance, disappeared in the weeks following the 
invasion.  Starting on April 16, 2003, Iraqi citizens began a violent looting spree across 
the country.  Nearly every government office, archive, and weapons depot was 
systematically stripped of every valuable item.  Unfortunately, coalition forces, which 
were still conducting combat operations against the regime diehards, did little to stop the 
pillaging.   
The coalition attempted to solve the crisis by creating the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) on May 6, 2003, under the authority of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer.132  
Bremer would issue two critical orders that would ignite the insurgency.  The CPA’s first 
order called for the “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.”  The intent was to remove the 
top four levels of Baath Party leadership from the new government.  According to the 
Baghdad station chief, the order “just disenfranchised more than 30,000 people.”133  
These Baath party members, particularly at the lower levels, were the government 
bureaucrats, administrators, and supervisors who had run the country throughout the 
sanctions period.  They were Ba’ath Party members because that was the only way for 
them to keep their jobs.   
The second order dissolved all Iraqi security ministries, all Iraqi military 
formations, the National Assembly, all National courts, and a host of other agencies that 
supported the former regime.134  While Mr. Bremer’s intent was to recreate these entities 
in a new Iraqi government, the immediate impact was the complete disappearance of any 
formal security structure except for the Coalition forces.  This decision also provided a 
nucleus of armed and knowledgeable personnel that would help the growing Sunni 
insurgency to take hold.  
From the beginning, the Sunni insurgency within Iraq had several leaders and 
bases of support.  The most apparent group was the former regime loyalists, led by 
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Saddam fedayeen and supported by former Ba’ath Party officials.  These insurgents 
wanted to return Saddam Hussein to power.  The second insurgent group was the 
nationalists, which included the Islamic Army of Iraq.135  These fighters were unified in 
their resistance to the coalition presence and a return of Iraqi sovereignty, but did not 
advocate a return of the Ba’ath regime.  The third set was religiously motivated 
insurgents, which included Zarqawi’s Tawhid wah Jihad (Unity and Holy War).  Their 
goal was to establish a Sunni Islamic state within Iraq’s borders.  All three types of 
groups were unified in their resistance to Iraq’s occupation and the creation of a popular 
democracy.136   
Zarqawi established an alliance of convenience with the Sunni tribes of Anbar 
province between Summer 2003 and Spring 2004.  The Sunni, who were afraid of a Shia-
dominated government in Baghdad, adopted a violent resistance campaign.137  Zarqawi 
and his followers needed an area where he could accept and train both Iraqi and foreign 
recruits.  In addition to open training areas, the Euphrates River valley also provided a 
natural route to funnel fighters from Ramadi, the provincial capital, to Baghdad and its 
environs.138   
In Spring 2004, Tawhid wah Jihad began to openly fight U.S. forces in Anbar 
Province and Baghdad.  In April, Sunni insurgents took over the city of Fallujah after a 
short, fierce fight with US Marines in the area.  In May, Zarqawi personally beheaded 
American captive Nicholas Berg, in “revenge for the humiliation of Iraqi prisoners at 
Abu Ghraib.”139  The summer months saw a dramatic increase in suicide bombings, 
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which targeted both coalition forces and civilians.140  In particular, the use of suicide car 
bombers spread fear and destroyed trust across the country.   
In each instance of violence, Zarqawi’s followers captured the act on video and 
later broadcast the operations to the world through the media and Internet.  This method 
was very effective for two reasons.  First, it gave the Iraqi Sunni both heroes to support 
and victories to cheer.  Additionally, the videos inspired others Muslims in the region to 
contribute arms, money, and volunteers to continue the fight against the American 
occupation.141   
Throughout 2004, Zarqawi’s reputation among the Sunni population grew as 
coalition casualties steadily increased.  Relatively speaking, Tawhid wah Jihad was small 
in comparison to the other insurgent groups.  However, its ability to damage American 
forces and credibility gave it outsized influence among the people.  As a symbol of 
Zarqawi’s strength and importance, Al Qaeda’s central command accepted Tawhid wah 
Jihad’s allegiance on 19 October 2004.142  TWJ became Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two 
Rivers, or Al Qaeda in Iraq, the first official AQ affiliate outside of Afghanistan.   
Zarqawi, now AQI’s Emir, had demonstrated to both the Iraqi people and his fellow 
jihadists that he was willing to employ any means necessary to drive the Americans out 
of Iraq.  
D. 2004–2005:  AL QAEDA IN IRAQ AND ITS BASE OF SUPPORT 
Shortly after the shift in allegiance to Al Qaeda, AQI suffered two setbacks. In 
November 2004, coalition forces retook the city of Fallujah, killing and capturing over 
1,000 fighters and stripping the insurgency of a crucial training and staging area.143  The 
following January, Iraq successfully held its first national election in the post-Saddam 
era.  While the Sunnis of Anbar Province boycotted the event, the Shia and Kurds 
participated in heavy numbers, and gained oversized representation in the new Iraqi 
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Parliament.  In the aftermath of these two events, some of the Sunni tribal leaders 
concluded that the political process “might hold more benefit than continued fighting.”144 
For Zarqawi, compromise between Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Iraq government was 
never an option.  Zarqawi saw the success of Iraqi democracy as the death-knell for his 
movement.  If the Iraqi government were able to establish itself and effectively control 
the security environment, then AQI would have to either “fight them…their cousins and 
their sons” or “pack up and go in search of another land.”145 
Al Qaeda in Iraq responded to these setbacks with a surge in violence, primarily 
aimed at the Shia majority in Iraq.  Zarqawi’s strategy was to simply incite a sectarian 
war between Sunni and Shia.  The conflict, which followed Zarqawi’s ideology, would 
unify the Sunni to resist both the Shia and the coalition presence.  The civil war would 
also prevent the new Iraqi government from establishing itself, and leave the country in a 
political vacuum.  Zarqawi and Al Qaeda could then step into the vacuum, declare 
themselves guardians of the Iraqi Sunni, and establish a new political entity.   
In the process of inciting sectarian hatred, Zarqawi and his forces also worked to 
embed themselves within the Sunni tribal structure.  The first tactic, which AQI copied 
from its Afghan brethren, was to marry its members into prominent Sunni tribal families.  
This technique, while effective with Afghanistan’s Pashtu, was quite unpopular among 
the Sunnis of Anbar.  Traditionally, it was forbidden to marry off women to “anyone 
outside of the larger tribal confederation.”146  When tribal members resisted these 
attempts, Al Qaeda operatives responded with violence and intimidation against the 
families.  Thus, the marriage campaign only succeeded in creating enmity between AQI 
and some of the tribal families.  
The antagonism between AQI and the Sunni tribes grew with Zarqawi’s second 
initiative: to take control of the regional black market trade.  The continual flow of 
foreign fighters to AQI’s ranks required a steady source of revenue for training and arms.  
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The region’s traditional source of revenue was the black market –activities such as 
smuggling, banditry, and extortion.  Under Saddam Hussein, the local tribes had 
exclusive control of this lucrative system.147  When Zarqawi attempted to muscle in on 
these markets, the tribal response was quite negative.  In fact, one of the Anbar 
Awakening’s first leaders, Abu Risha Sittar, was both a tribal leader and a notorious 
highway bandit.  His motivation to resist AQI came not just from an ideological and 
moral viewpoint, but also from the economic restraints that Zarqawi tried to impose on 
his business.148  
The third mistake that AQI made during this transition period was the attempt to 
impose its belief system on the Anbar population.  AQI required both strict adherence to 
sharia law and harsh punishment for disobedience.  These punishments varied from 
breaking the fingers of cigarette smokers to executing women who did not wear the 
niqab.149  These methods did little to endear the Islamists’ cause to either the tribal 
leaders or the general population.   
In spite of the growing tension, AQI successfully used violence and intimidation 
to limit tribal dissent.  In May 2005, the Abu Nimr and Albu Mahal tribes, frustrated with 
AQI’s actions, formed the Hamza Battalion and attempted to work with US Marines 
during Operation Matador.  There was little communication or coordination between the 
two sides, though, and the effort collapsed.  A vengeful AQ retaliated against the Hamza 
Battalion, and defeated the tribal militia by September 2005.150  The Albu Fahd tribe, 
located near the provincial capital of Ramadi, attempted to distance themselves from AQI 
in late 2005.  AQI responded by assassinating the tribal leader, Sheikh Nasr al-Fahdawi, 
in a midnight raid.151  Finally, in January 2006, a suicide bomber killed 70 Sunni police 
recruits in Ramadi, who had volunteered at the behest of their tribal leaders.152   
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By February 2006, the situation between AQI and the Sunni tribes in Anbar was 
precarious.  Al Qaeda in Iraq, fighting with foreign volunteers and Iraqi tribal support, 
was in a heavy fight with coalition forces.  AQI was also dealing with growing discontent 
among the local tribes over cultural, economic, and ideological differences.  It had 
already put down at least two tribal uprisings in Qaim and Ramadi, which had the effect 
of activating tribal revenge obligations.153  The only factor that kept the Sunnis from 
completely bolting from Al Qaeda was the fear of Shia domination across the country.  In 
spite of the internal violence, AQI’s actions against the Shia-backed government 
continued to unify the tribal elements and Sunni militias.  
E. 2006:  THE SAMARRA BOMBING AND THE ANBAR AWAKENING 
In the early morning hours of 22 February 2006, Haytham Sabah Mahmood Badri 
led a cell of seven insurgents into the Al Askari Shrine in Samarra, Iraq.  The group 
bound the security guards and planted high explosives throughout the building complex.  
Shortly after sunrise, the insurgents detonated the explosives, which collapsed the 
shrine’s golden dome and destroyed one of Shia Islam’s holiest landmarks.154    
The Al Askari Mosque attack started the sectarian war fight that Zarqawi 
envisioned in his 2004 letter to Zawahiri.  After nearly two years of bombings and 
attacks, Iraq’s Shia population responded with violence.  In 2005, the average monthly 
rate for civilian casualties (both Sunni and Shia) ranged between 100 and 300 killed.  
After the Samarra bombing, the casualty rate spiked dramatically.  In March 2006, the 
month after the bombing, there were nearly 1,000 civilian casualties across Iraq.  By 
October 2006, the monthly death toll was 3,709.155     
While Zarqawi may have started the sectarian war, Al Qaeda in Iraq was in no 
position to protect the Sunni population, for the group’s reputation was far larger than its 
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operational size and capability.   According to captured documents, AQI’s core of emirs, 
administrative staff, and advisors was approximately 250 personnel.  The remaining rank 
and file members consisted of foreign fighters, who were primarily suicide bombers, and 
local fighters, who served with the support of their tribal leaders.156  AQI’s structure was 
simply not strong enough to fight a protracted campaign against a larger force.  AQI’s 
numbers were miniscule in comparison to other insurgent groups, such as the Islamic 
Army of Iraq (between 3,000–17,000)157 or the Shia’s Mahdi Army (between 5,000–
10,000).158   
Additionally, AQI and the tribes had different long-term goals.  Zarqawi wanted 
to replace tribal loyalty with “an ideological commitment to jihadi-salafi ideological 
goals.”159 The tribes, however, were unwilling to surrender their independence to any 
outside organization.  AQI wanted to promote a divisive sectarian war.  The tribes, on the 
other hand, saw no rationale in promoting such a conflict.  Al Anbar had a small Shia 
population, primarily located in the Abu Ghraib area east of Fallujah, which did not 
threaten provincial security.  Finally, AQI was a committed advocate of suicide 
bombings.  Sunni tribal leaders, though, were unenthusiastic about seeing “their sons 
shrouded in explosive vests” in order to achieved AQI’s objectives.160   
The Sunni ambivalence became clear after Zarqawi died in a coalition airstrike in 
June 2006.  A notable response came from the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), a group that 
had many tribal fighters and was an apparent compatriot with AQI.  Notice how IAI 
distanced itself from AQI’s activities:  
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This incident is grievous and pleasant at the same time.  It is grievous 
because we lost a dear brother and hero mujahid who engaged in 
battlefields.  I am happy because he will be rewarded for the good deeds 
he has done . . . . . we (Islamic Army of Iraq) have no organizational 
relations [with AQI]; rather it is a relation of brotherhood by religion and 
unity of ranks.161 
After a summer of internal discussion and debate, the Sunni tribes decided to act.  
On 17 September 2006, several tribes held a conference called “The Day of 
Awakening.”162  In this historic meeting, the tribes publicly denounced AQI and their 
presence in Anbar.  In blunt terms, one of the attending sheikhs said, 
We all say to the terrorists, leave because you have no place in Al-Anbar 
Governorate after now.  We have discovered from where you get financed 
and who orders you to kill our Iraqi cousins.  Leave now or you will be 
killed in an ugly way.  We are determined to fight you face to face.  God is 
great.163 
Al Qaeda in Iraq, using the auspices of the Mujahedeen Shura Council, responded 
rapidly with a new proclamation.164  On 15 October 2006, AQI established the Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI), declaring it, “the sole legitimate ruling institution across much of 
Iraq.”165  From Ramadi, ISI’s new capital, Emir Abu Umar al-Baghdadi called for all of 
the various insurgent groups to unite under his leadership and to refrain from “rebelling 
against its dictates.”166   
AQI’s attempts to rebrand itself were unsuccessful.  ISI had declared political 
control over much of Iraq, but was neither willing nor able to provide the population’s 
basic needs.167  Baghdadi’s call for unity only reinforced the impression that AQI was 
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“pursuing an international and not an Iraqi agenda.”168  Salafi groups allied with AQI 
responded negatively as well.  Jihad al-Ansari, an insurgent leader, sent an open letter to 
ISI in March 2007, criticizing the creation of an “Islamic state:”   
When the U.S.-led coalition approached the Anbar Sunni tribes and proposed a 
tactical alliance, the tribes responded favorably.  The resulting offensive drove AQI 
operatives out of Anbar Province.  By 2008, AQI had nearly collapsed—it has lost its 
safe haven, freedom of maneuver, and political influence inside of the province.169  AQI 
had failed to embed with Anbar’s Sunni tribes, and was now facing its ultimate defeat. 
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F. ANALYSIS 




Figure 4.   AQI, the Iraqi Government, and the Sunni tribes in the SEI model. 
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Prior to 2003, the Saddam regime and the Sunni tribes maintained a simple 
alliance.  Saddam gave the tribal leaders relative autonomy as long as they did not rebel 
against the regime.  In return, the tribe could maintain their black market economy 
without government interference.  This alliance was particularly useful during the oil 
embargo after Operation Desert Storm.  
The coalition victory in Baghdad, in combination with the subsequent looting, led 
to a collapse in state capacity (PO #1 in Figure 3).  The CPA’s decision to fire all Ba’ath 
party members and to disband the Iraqi Army gave the insurgency an incredible boost in 
resources and manpower.  These events led to Iraq entering the period of the failing state 
in the summer of 2003, while the Sunni insurgency began to grow.   
As for the Sunni tribes, their expectations also dropped with the removal of the 
Saddam regime.  The actions of the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council did little to 
increase any expectations of government support in Anbar Province.  In fact, the rise of 
Shia dominance within the government forced the tribes to focus inward for their own 
protection and safety.   The eventual goal was to return to a level of power and influence 
with the central government.  The tribes supported this goal by providing fighters for the 
insurgency.  
Al Qaeda in Iraq (then known as Tawhid wah Jihad) began to gain power and 
influence through their resistance to both the US occupation and the nascent Iraqi 
Governing Council.  Through the use of spectacular, high visibility attacks, such as the 
United Nations compound in Baghdad, TWJ used violence to both increase recruitment 
efforts and to display clear resistance to the coalition’s presence in the country. 
Tawhid wah Jihad entered the social embedding stage during the first Battle of 
Fallujah in April 2004 (PO #2 on Figure 3).  The failure of the US coalition to retake the 
city gave TWJ incredible power and influence.  The battle’s outcome confirmed to the 
Sunni tribes was that TWJ and the other insurgent groups were protecting the Sunni 
community from the Shia dominated forces in Baghdad.  This impression led to an 
acceptance of TWJ tactics and presence throughout Anbar Province.  This also led to an 
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increased level of support for the hundreds of foreign fighters that were entering the 
country through Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.   
TWJ, which became AQI in October 2004, attempted to expand its influence 
among the Sunni tribes in 2005.  Zarqawi’s group, using Afghanistan as their example, 
attempted to co-opt the Sunnis by marrying their fighters into some of the larger tribes.  
Additionally, there were efforts to enforce Sharia law in the province.  Common 
activities, such as smoking, listening to music, and shaving, were outlawed.  Finally AQI 
used violence to murder and intimidate tribal leaders who resisted their efforts.  The 
defeat of the Hamza Battalion in September 2005 was one of several examples of AQI 
using force to maintain their dominance.  Their use of violence, combined with their 
ideology, was starting to repel the Sunni tribes.   
While the tribes were not pleased with AQI’s actions, they were more fearful of 
Shia domination of the political system.  This was particularly acute after the first 
election boycott in January 2005, when the Shia and Kurds were overrepresented in the 
constitutional assembly.170  With this clear split of interests, the Sunni were unable to 
mount a unified campaign against AQI.  Thus, the terror group was able to maintain the 
appearance of communal integrity.  This ruse was effective in convincing outsiders that 
the Sunni were united in its opposition to the occupation.  
When AQI operatives destroyed the al Askari shrine on February 22, 2006, the 
Sunni’s long-held fear of a Shia revenge campaign became manifest.  In response, the 
different Sunni communities unified to protect themselves against the Shia, a threat larger 
and more dangerous than the coalition.  The mosque bombing succeeded in elevating 
Sunni expectation from mere security to communal integrity and survival.   
This unification came at a cost to AQI.  Zarqawi and his salafi forces had wanted 
a sectarian conflict from the beginning of the war.  Now that one was imminent, AQI was 
in no position to take advantage.  Its numbers were far too small to protect the millions of 
Sunni in Baghdad and across the country.  It had not established any means of 
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governance to replace the regime in Baghdad.  It had no method of providing essential 
services or resources to the population.  AQI has instigated a civil crisis, but was 
incapable of institution civil order.   
The Samarra bombing led to Anbar Awakening, the third political opportunity in 
the model (PO3 in Figure 3).  AQI’s self-inflicted civil crisis with the Shia exacerbated 
the group’s ongoing conflict with the Sunni tribes.  Months of violence and repressive 
action against tribal leaders and customs seriously damaged AQI’s reservoir of local 
support.  The creation of the Anbar Awakening Council, with its unambiguous hostility 
towards foreign fighters, confirmed AQI’s rapid descent.   
AQI’s attempt to re-establish control through the Islamic State of Iraq was flawed 
on several levels.  ISI did not address the gap between the group’s capability and popular 
expectations.  AQI’s promotion of the Mujahedeen Shura Council was an effort to make 
the state appear as an Iraqi creation.  AQI even claimed that it had “dissolved itself and 
…declared its allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as emir of the believers.”171 AQI’s 
efforts to become a homegrown movement did not convince the Iraqi Sunni.  Instead, it 
reconfirmed AQI’s arrogance and further unified the Sunni tribal alliance.   
The Anbar Awakening Movement also gave the Iraqi Government increased 
legitimacy.  When Movement leaders met with Prime Minister Maliki on 27 September 
2006, they limited their cooperation to, “the security situation and preserving the safety 
and security of Iraq and that is all.”172  Maliki and the coalition responded by forming a 
tactical alliance with the Anbar Movement, with the US committing over $150 million to 
the tribes.173 
The alliance began to pay dividends in 2007.  The tribes began to assume security 
duties within the province.  The Albu Mahal tribe took effective control of the region’s 
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Iraqi Army brigade, while the Albu Risha tribe assumed control of the Ramadi Police.174  
Additionally, the Sons of Iraq (SOI) movement—with US assistance—began to actively 
fight AQI across both Anbar Province.  While this alliance was mere tactical, with no 
long-term agreement in place, both sides shared the desired outcome of forcing AQI out 
of the region.175  The result throughout 2007–2008 was the steady decline in AQI’s 
capability, while the Iraqi government’s ability steadily increased.   
The final political opportunity (PO #4 in Figure 4) appeared on 1 January 2009, 
when the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Iraq took 
effect.  The treaty defined the terms and conditions under which US forces can operate 
within the Iraq—from travel and weapons to legal rights and staging areas.  More 
importantly, the SOFA defined the limits of the American presence within Iraq:  “All the 
United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 
2011.”176  With this declaration, the government’s political capacity and Sunni popular 
expectations combined into one.   
Al Qaeda in Iraq entered the Iraq War with a clear ideology and an effective 
message:  jihad is the best way to drive the coalition out of Iraq.  With a radical ideology 
and a dependence on foreign fighter support, AQI needed local sponsorship in order to 
survive.  The Sunni tribes of Anbar Province welcomed the group’s vigor and 
determination, but balked at its larger salafist goals.  The partnership worked, though, for 
nearly two years.  When AQI attempted to impose its salafist vision on the province, the 
alliance began to disintegrate because of a lack of popular support.  The rise of the Anbar 
Salvation and Awakening Council, combined with the financial and military support of 
the Iraqi government and U.S. Coalition, meant the end of AQI’s safe haven in Iraq.  
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IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A socially embedded insurgency provides a difficult challenge for a political 
regime.  Unlike a normal insurgency, the local population has embraced the strategy and 
methods of the socially embedded insurgent.  When this combination occurs, the regime 
must face a number of unpleasant choices.  If the regime wants to break the link between 
the people and the group, then it may have to initiate an extremely violent conflict.  If the 
regime accepts the insurgent’s presence, then it risks giving the group increased 
legitimacy and attention.  Finally, if the regime allows the insurgent into the political 
process, then it risks its own sovereignty and survival.   
This thesis illustrated insurgent conflict as a competition between a regime and its 
rival to fulfill the needs of the local population.  These popular needs, according to a 
societal view of Maslow’s Hierarchy, has five levels.  The lowest level is the security of 
essential resources, such as food, clothing, and shelter.  The second level is to guarantee 
safety and security.  The third level is to perpetuate communal integrity.  The fourth level 
is gain power and prestige.  The fifth and final need is to continue state maturation and 
advance ideologies.   
This thesis postulated that when the regime cannot meet the needs of the 
population, it begins to fail as a state.  Through words and deeds, an insurgency can 
surpass the regime’s capabilities by providing for the people.  When this occurs, the 
insurgency enters the period of social embedding.  Over time, the insurgency can become 
deeply embedded into the local population.  The regime can reverse the embedding if it 
can increase its own capability or reduces the insurgent’s abilities.  
From the two case studies in this thesis, it is clear that a socially embedded 
insurgency is very dangerous to a regime.  Hezbollah, through implementation of a 
practical ideology, successfully embedded with its Shia population during Lebanon’s 14-
year civil war.  It is also clear that social embedding is not a foregone conclusion.  Al 
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Qaeda in Iraq, while starting with high levels of support, failed to embed because it 
embraced a violent ideology that the Sunni tribes rejected.    
This chapter looks at several questions.  What are the key factors that determine 
social embedding?  What is the role of violence?  How can one accurately identify a 
political opportunity?  What can a decision maker do to fight these insurgencies when 
they appear? What is the role of a foreign power in fighting an embedded insurgency?   
B. KEY FINDINGS 
1. Socially Embedded Insurgencies Depend on an “Engine” of Support 
for Success   
As a socially embedded insurgency, Hezbollah conducted a resistance campaign 
without fearing the loss of popular support.  This confidence came from the strength of 
Hezbollah’s “engine:” The Holy Reconstruction Organ, known as Jihad al Binaa.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Hezbollah’s support cycle (simplified) 
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Figure 4 is a simple illustration of Hezbollah’s cycle of support.  The cycle starts 
with Hezbollah’s ability to provide reconstruction and social services.  As Jihad al-Binaa 
became more effective, popular support for Hezbollah increased.  The increase in popular 
support led to an increase in intelligence and funding.  In turn, the increased intelligence 
and funding led to an increase in Hezbollah’s overall capability.  This increased 
capability led to an increase in social and reconstruction services for the people, and the 
cycle began anew.   
The key for Hezbollah was that this engine of support was separate and distinct 
from its combat divisions, the Islamic Resistance and Islamic Jihad.  As such, when the 
war ended in 1989, the reconstruction arm continued to function and Hezbollah was able 
to maintain its base of support.   
Contrast Hezbollah’s engine with Al Qaeda in Iraq’s cycle of support.   
 
Figure 6.   AQI’s Support Cycle (simplified) 
Figure 5 shows a simplified version of AQI’s support engine.  As the group 
engaged in violent and highly advertised acts, it garnered support from Iraq’s Sunni 
population.  As the support increased, then the Sunni provided safe havens and 
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intelligence to protect AQI operatives from the government and coalition forces.  The 
increased safe havens allowed AQI to improve its recruiting capabilities, which brought 
more fighters into the organization.  In turn, the increased fighting capability allowed 
AQI to conduct more spectacular attacks, and the cycle repeated itself.   
Unlike Hezbollah, AQI depended on violence to maintain its support system. As 
long as the Sunni population supported the increasing levels of violence, then AQI was 
successful.  When Zarqawi and his forces began to use violence on the Sunni, however, 
the popular support began to decrease, along with the number of safe havens and the flow 
of foreign fighters.   
2. Violence Is Not an Effective Tool to Become Socially Embedded  
Violence is a common and effective tool for both insurgents and the regime.  Both 
sides use violence to destroy enemy resources, control the local population, and shape 
public opinion.  An insurgency, though, cannot use violence over the long term to 
become socially embedded.   
AQI serves as an important example of the misuse of violence.  For a time, AQI 
held some level of popular support among the Sunni in Anbar Province.  It conducted a 
destructive bombing campaign against coalition forces that separated them from the local 
population.  It also used its information campaign to recruit a hundreds of foreign fighters 
from across the region.   
When AQI attempted to impose its ideology on the Sunni tribes, though, it 
encountered resistance.  AQI, in turn, began to target and murder tribal leaders, their 
family members, and other Sunni in an effort to maintain dominance.  This started a 
negative cycle of control that AQI could not maintain.  Eventually, the tribes broke away 
from AQI with the Anbar Awakening, thus ensuring that the insurgent group would never 
become socially embedded in the province.   
In comparison, Hezbollah did not rely on violence to control the Shia.  This is not 
to say that Hezbollah was not a violent organization—on the contrary, it was one of the 
first Islamic organizations to widely use suicide bombing in combat.  However, 
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Hezbollah did not use violence to control the Shia population.  Hezbollah’s primary 
targets were Western forces (until their withdrawal in 1984), Israeli troops, and 
competing armed factions, such as AMAL and the SLA.   
3.  The Perception of Occupation Will Give Energy to an Insurgency, 
Which Can Lead to Social Embedding 
In both case studies, the presence of an unwelcome foreign power contributed to 
the group’s rise to power.  This contrasts with the perception of the enemy for both cases 
before invasion.   
For Israel, invading southern Lebanon was a matter of national honor.  The PLO 
was continuing to send rockets and fighters from its southern Lebanese safe haven into 
Israel, which was unacceptable to the government in Tel Aviv.  Israel thought that the 
Shia would appreciate the IDF intervention, for they would drive the foreign Palestinians 
out of the Litani River valley and bring relative peace to the region.   
This, however, was not the impression of the Shia in southern Lebanon.  Beirut’s 
acceptance of the IDF invasion only confirmed two Shia suspicions:  the central 
government would not protect them and that Israel wanted to take their land.  Eventually, 
Hezbollah was able to capture this anger and use it as fuel to grow their insurgency.  
A similar situation occurred over twenty years later, when the United States 
invaded Iraq.  By all accounts, Saddam Hussein was an evil man who controlled his 
country through force and intimidation.  He repeatedly broke international law and 
United Nations resolutions.  He used chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iranians in 
the 1980s.  In the 1990s, after Operation Desert Storm, Saddam used his army to brutally 
suppress a rebellion in both northern and southern Iraq, killing thousands of people in the 
process.  Several decision makers thought that removing Saddam from power would lead 
to the rise of a new Iraq.   
Unfortunately, like the Israelis in Lebanon, American ideals did not match Iraqi 
reality.  The loss of order in the country after the fall of Saddam shook local faith in U.S. 
promises to restore the country.  When the CPA dissolved both the Ba’ath Party and the 
Iraqi Army, it fed Sunni suspicions that America simply wanted to control Iraq’s oil 
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wealth instead of help the Iraqi people.  This anger and resentment helped to fuel the 
nascent insurgency, and AQI was able to use that fuel to grow its insurgency.  
4. Political Opportunities Clearly Change the Status Quo for All Parties 
Both sides in an insurgency, the insurgent group and the state, want to highlight a 
specific event to show a change in momentum for themselves and a loss of support for 
the enemy.   These events can range from a spectacular attack on an important base of 
support to participation in a national election.  In most cases, the opposing side can 
dismiss the action as propaganda or misinformation.  Political opportunities, though, are 
different.  When these events take place, they fundamentally change the status quo 
between the warring factions and the local population, and force all sides to adjust to a 
new reality. 
In Lebanon, the 1989 Taif Accords brought an end to Lebanon’s 14-year civil 
war.  The Lebanese government could, for the first time, focus on rebuilding the country 
and reuniting its war-torn people.  Hezbollah, as a major rival, wanted to consolidate its 
political, military, and social power within the country.  The country’s Shia population, 
united after years of war and hostile to the pre-war status quo, were willing to support the 
side that could fulfill its social and political objectives.  Both sides recognized this 
change to the overall environment, and worked hard to garner Shia support in the 1992 
elections.   
Contrast the Taif Accords with the November 1989 Tehran conclave.  
Hezbollah’s decision to abandon the pure ideological path and participate in the elections 
was an important event.  However, this event did not change Beirut’s approach to 
reconstruction or the parliamentary campaign, because Beirut knew nothing about it.  
Lebanon’s Shia, which would benefit greatly from the result, also did not change their 
behavior for the same reason.  Thus, while the Taif Accord was a political opportunity, 
the Tehran conclave was not.   
For Al Qaeda in Iraq, there were many momentous events in the group’s rise and 
fall with the population.  One event that appeared to be a political opportunity was the 
Samarra bombing in February 2006.  It initiated a violent sectarian conflict between 
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Sunni and Shia and undermined faith in the Iraqi government.  However, the Sunni tribes 
in Anbar were not directly affected by the bombing.  Anbar is a majority Sunni province 
with a small Shia population.  Thus, Anbar did not see the heavy fighting that took place 
in Baghdad, Nineveh Province, and other mixed sectarian areas.   
The situation was different with the Anbar Salvation and Awakening.  When the 
Sunni tribal leaders openly rejected AQI’s tactics and presence in the province, AQI had 
no choice but to give a strong response.  Likewise, the Iraqi government in Baghdad 
responded clearly as well, when Prime Minister Maliki welcomed the Anbar tribal chiefs 
in Baghdad and pledged support for their campaign.  The Anbar Awakening was a clear 
political opportunity that changed the status quo in Anbar Province   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Finding and Breaking the Insurgency’s “Engine” Is Essential   
When the insurgency is socially embedded, it receives its energy and drive from a 
system that is separate from the conflict with the ruling government.  In the case of 
Hezbollah, it received massive Shia support from both its religious ideology and its social 
service support.  In the midst of the civil war, Hezbollah was able to build schools, 
hospitals, roads, and homes—things that the Lebanese government failed to do in the 
prewar period.  This practical ideology earned Shia loyalty for Hezbollah that was 
virtually impossible for the central government to seize.   
In the AQI study, the group’s support system depended on the visible application 
of violence.  The violence served the purpose of garnering foreign fighters and ensuring a 
safe haven in the Sunni tribal areas.  Once AQI became violent with its benefactors, 
though, the Sunni support system began to defect.  This ideology of violence only 
succeeded in driving AQI’s support base into the arms of the Iraqi government and the 
US coalition.   
If a regime wants a realistic chance of defeating a socially embedded insurgency, 
then it is essential to break the insurgent’s engine of support.  In Hezbollah’s case, the 
Lebanese government would have to both reduce Hezbollah’s social services capability  
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and provide an equivalent replacement to the Shia population.  It would also need to do 
so in a rapid and efficient manner, for a significant time lag would only anger the local 
population.   
Needless to say, such an endeavor for the government would be incredibly 
difficult, particularly in the face of Hezbollah’s violent resistance and the local 
population’s cool reception to the Christian and Sunni dominated government.  The 
destruction and replacement campaign would require years of effective work in order to 
pull Shia support away from Hezbollah’s remnants.  Additionally, there is no guarantee 
that another group would not rise and take Hezbollah’s place.  It is far more effective to 
prevent social embedding in the first place.   
2. Strategic Communication and Strategic Patience Is Critical   
To prevent an insurgency from becoming socially embedded, it is necessary to 
control the high ground of strategic communications.  The insurgent will use the media to 
shape public opinion, target regime support, and to demoralize the opposition.  The 
United States, in its efforts to support a regime’s counterinsurgency efforts, must provide 
technical and financial assistance in the realm of strategic communications.   
Strategic communications in modern times is both simple to execute and difficult 
to control.  Both Hezbollah and AQI established media outlets to spread their information 
across the Middle East and the wider world.177  In Lebanon, the central government was 
too weak to broadcast a credible alternative.  On the other hand, Iraq’s information 
environment had excessive media coverage, making it difficult for the government 
message to capture and sustain popular attention.  The United States must commit 
resources and technology to counter these two effects.   
In addition to strategic communications, the United States must exercise strategic 
patience in its efforts.  During the Cold War, the U.S. fought communist ideology from 
1947–1989, an era lasting over four decades.  The British campaign against the Irish 
Republican Army lasted from 1969–2007, a period of thirty-eight years.  The modern 
                                                 
177 Hezbollah’s Al Manar is one of the most popular television networks in the Middle East, while 
AQI’s Al Sahab was a primary source of televised attacks during the group’s heyday.  
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media environment tends to demand fast and easy solutions to complex problem.  The 
United States, and the counterinsurgent regimes that it supports, must resist the quick 
solution and maintain a long view of the conflict.   
When fashioning a strategic communications plan, the United States and its 
counterinsurgent ally must emphasis long-term behavior, not immediate events.  Similar 
to AQI’s methods in Iraq, an insurgent will highlight any tactical success and attempt to 
portray it as a strategic defeat for the regime.  To maintain popular support for the 
conflict, the U.S. has to acknowledge tactical shortfalls, but must also emphasize strategic 
successes.  Examples of insurgent actions to exploit include:  insurgent targeting of 
innocent civilians, popular rejection of insurgent tactics, and conditions within insurgent 
safe havens.  If the U.S. and the regime can portray these events as typical for insurgent 
behavior, then communications will be more effective with both the local population and 
outside observers.   
3. Before Beginning an Intervention in a Conflict Zone, Do Your 
Homework  
In both Lebanon and Iraq, foreign intervention inadvertently led to the 
strengthening of hostile insurgencies.  For Israel, its invasion of southern Lebanon led to 
the growth of Hezbollah.  For the United State, its post-Saddam actions led to the rise of 
AQI.  In both cases, it was clear that the foreign intervention was not clearly planned 
from initial entry to final exit.   
Conflict zones are, by their nature, very unpredictable.  This does not mean, 
however, that a foreign power can enter without a plan.  An invasion plan must have a 
clear strategy that balances objectives, methods, and resources.  Without a good plan, 
there is a real risk that unintended consequences will drag the foreign power into a long 
and costly conflict.   
Additionally, the foreign power needs good intelligence analysis on the 
environment before invading.  Both the United States and Israel, prior to their invasions, 
locked on information that confirmed their suspicions on their planned enemy (Saddam 
Hussein for the United States and the PLO for Israel).  Little work was done to 
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understand the secondary and tertiary audiences in the battle.  For Israel, there appears to 
have been little appreciation for the situation of Lebanon’s Shia.  For the United States, 
there appears to have been little understanding of the role of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq.  It is 
possible that good analysis could have exposed these oversights.   
4.  Empower the Local Population in Defeating the Insurgency  
The insurgency gains its strength from the local population.  Likewise, the only 
force that can destroy an insurgency is the local population.  When the insurgency is 
socially embedded, though, the problem is much more difficult.  The regime must not 
only break the ties of dependence between the local population and the insurgency, it 
must also replace those ties with an acceptable substitute.   
Despite any good intentions, superior resources, or apparent wisdom, a foreign 
power cannot empower the local population.  The insurgency gained it embedding power 
through the regime’s weakness.  Only the regime itself can demonstrate the strength and 
competence necessary to convince the local populace that it is ready to lead again.   
As a foreign power, the Unites States can assist the regime in a number of ways.  
Militarily, the U.S. can provide training and logistics support to the regime’s military 
forces.  It can, in certain circumstances, provide direct military action, such as air cover 
or ground combat forces.  It is important, though that the regime forces take the lead in 
combat operations, otherwise, the local community may attach operational success or 
failure to the American presence, instead of the regime’s actions.   
Diplomatically, the United States can support its ally through treaty agreements 
with its neighbors, sanctions or embargos for foreign insurgent supporters, and 
resolutions against the insurgent group.  It can also pressure other nations to withhold 
recognition of the insurgent cause and refuse to meet with insurgent representatives.  As a 
major power on the international stage, the U.S can also highlight the plight of the local 
population, thus blocking the insurgent’s own media efforts.  
The critical idea in supporting the regime’s efforts is to amplify its efforts to a 
wide audience.  The international community must perceive the fight as between a lawful 
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regime and an unlawful insurgency.  Embedded insurgencies succeed when they can 
drown out the voice of a weakened regime.  American support for the regime can prevent 
that from occurring.   
D.  CONCLUSION 
Insurgent conflict is a reality of modern warfare.  As long as resistance groups can 
successfully use violence to achieve their political objectives, states will have to deal with 
the insurgent threat.  However, the socially embedded insurgency presents a far more 
difficult crisis for a state, for such entities have legitimacy and power in the eyes of the 
local population.  Removing these insurgents will require a high price in blood and 
treasure.   By recognizing these danger signs when they occur, the counterinsurgent can 
apply the resources necessary to prevent the insurgency from gaining power.  A social 
embedded insurgency is neither inevitable nor invincible.  However, it is like an oak tree:  
much easier to cut down and handle while small. 
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